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The Experience of the Automotive
Industry in Industrial Policies of
Selected Governments
Thomas R. Atkinson,*
Susan G. Ezrati, t
James J. Flynnt
The effects of industrial policies have rarely been analyzed in any industry-
specific detail. Instead, judgments tend to be all-encompassing and depend on
the ideological view of the commentator. Yet, many countries have attempted
long-term industrial policies for particular industries. The automotive industry is
frequently a major focus of such programs. Accordingly, it is illuminating to
examine the effect of recent industrial policy programs of six governments on
motor vehicle manufacturing. It must be emphasized that this is not a study of
targeting which, while currently topical, is usually for a very limited objective
and not part of a broad integrated program.
We shall not define precisely industrial policy other than to note that the cases
we intend to examine involve some form of general, integrated, economic policy
that, among other things, includes industry-specific measures that have had direct
or indirect consequences for other countries through trade or investment links.
Many other characteristics, including program integration; abridgment of private
business governance, perhaps involving varying degrees of compulsion or sub-
sidy; non-market incentives; and subordination of the market mechanism, may or
may not be present in the industrial policies discussed. Very often specific
protection of favored industries is a major instrument of industrial policy; nearly
always, the other measures employed also create changes in international com-
petitiveness. Not all such factors, or objectives, need be present to constitute
industrial policy for our purposes.
* Senior Advisor, International General Motors Corporation; Vice President, General Motors
Overseas Corporation. Member, Investment Policy Advisory Committee to the Office of the United
States Trade Representative; Chairman, Industry Sector Advisory Committee to the U.S. Government
for the Tokyo Round Tade Negotiations, 1973-1979. A.B. 1943, Denison College; M.A. 1947,
University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. 1951, University of Wisconsin (Economics).
t Economics Staff, General Motors Corporation. Other GM staffs assisting this project include
those of GMOC Japan, GM Canada, GM France, Industry-Government Relations Staff in Brussels,
GM de Mexico, GM do Brasil, GM-Holden's (Australia), and Worldwide Product Planning, Detroit.
We are also indebted to the staff of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc.
266 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
Industrial policies employing only socio- and macro-economic measures such
as tax and expenditure policies or education or broad labor and community
programs will not be considered. Similarly, auto industry policies bearing little
relation to other national policies such as measures inhibiting consumer use of
motor vehicles to save resources, will not be reviewed as they do not represent
part of a general industrial policy. We recognize that industrial policies are
designed for a particular economy and environment, and judgments of them are
not necessarily transferable. Nevertheless, useful lessons may be found in the
role played by industrial policies for given industries in other countries.
This study examines the automotive sector aspects of the industrial policies of
six different governments, five of them nations and one, the European Commu-
nity, a supra-national organization with an overall program for its industrial
sector. The nations include two developing countries (Brazil and Mexico), a
recently arrived industrial giant (Japan), a mature industrial country (France), and
a resource-based developed country (Australia). In examining these cases, our
first task is to determine how the programs for the auto industry fit into the
general industrial policy of the country. Thereafter, we describe the various
representative instruments of policy, including import relief, subsidy, and regula-
tion. Finally, we analyze the effectiveness of the policy in reaching the intended
general goals and how the industry has appeared to fare.
Whatever the overall conclusions on industrial policies for all countries, these
programs have sharply different meanings for developing countries than they do
for industrial countries. Intervention in developing countries substitutes policy
judgments for market direction in determining how new or underutilized re-
sources may be employed, with probable long-term consequences. Within ma-
ture countries, industrial policy for the automotive industry may be restricted by
limited short-term capital or finite labor mobility. Policies in developed countries
are largely concerned with easing the painful adjustment of the industry to the
demands of international competition. Here industrial policy has produced a
dilemma which was recently described by the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) staff:
The fundamental question at the OECD intergovernmental level is as follows:
given the increasing and inevitable internationalization of automobile production,
how can governments facilitate positive adjustments in the automobile industry,
while both paying due regard to the problems-particularly of a social nature-that
may be posed by unduly abrupt adjustment, and avoiding distortions in interna-
tional trade?
One principle must be set forth at the outset: neither the automobile industry nor
governments themselves favour, or regard as an a priori necessity, intervention by
the public authorities in the industry's problems, particularly where trading strat-
egies are concerned. Governments' role should be as limited as possible, to ensure
that the economic and international environment created makes it easier to resolve
difficulties. It must also be recognized, however, that governments cannot dissoci-
ate themselves from an industry which is a major supplier of jobs, and is strategic,
politically sensitive and a source of technological progress. It is therefore necessary
to identify, at both national and international level, means of meeting these two
requirements which may conflict in certain difficult periods.'
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 267
I. JAPAN
The Japanese automotive industry has been the object of some form of indus-
trial policy since its inception. In the 1920s and 1930s, military preparedness was
the prime goal of Japanese industrial policy. In the early post World War II
period, the key goal was the creation of a national industry independent of
foreign influence. At various times, this goal had a rationale both in terms of how
the industry was seen to contribute to the overall national economic program and
the proximate goals for the industry itself. While the periods tend to overlap,







Building of basic modem industry
Creation of manufacturing efficiency
1960-1970




Adaptation to global integration
Avoidance of resource limitations




Consolidation of position in world economy




Corresponding Automotive Industry Goals
Import of technology
Elimination of dependence on foreign
manufacture
Develop supplier industries
Achievement of economies of scale
Rationalize terminal industry production
Fend off foreign investment in domestic
industry
Develop international competitiveness
Export volume aimed at foreign mass markets
Establishment of export technology and bases
for penetration of foreign markets
Preserve home base advantage for export
Create overseas manufacturing bases
Reduce foreign protectionism
Source: Adams and Ichimura, supra note 2. See also William Chandler Duncan, U.S.-Japan
Automobile Diplomacy, A Study in Economic Confrontation, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1973)
and Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1983) 198-304.
I. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 101 (1983).
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Practically speaking, postwar industrial policy dates from the end of the oc-
cupation in 1952, the same year in which U.S. purchases of vehicles in Japan for
the Korean War made the vision of a reawakened industrial sector realistic. In
1949, the Governor of the Bank of Japan urged the nation not to use its scarce
resources to build an automotive industry which it felt had little chance of being
competitive. 2 By the Korean War, the government's attitude had changed: the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) concluded that Japan, if left
alone, would continue to develop light industry but would never really create the
core sectors associated with a world industrial power. Consequently, the steel,
shipbuilding, and automotive industries became focal points for industrial plan-
ning by government.
When vehicle procurement orders were placed during the Korean War, MITI,
for the first time, requested that the Ministry of Finance make commercial bank
funds available in volume for expansion of the automotive industry. 3 Thereafter,
MITI assisted and shaped the industry through a series of laws, policy state-
ments, and informal pressure in the form of administrative guidance. There has
never been any doubt that the automotive industry was a prime candidate for
MITI's attention, second only, if at all, to the steel industry. 4 The various instru-
ments used by MITI or by other ministries at MITI's urging are shown in Table 2.
Only limited comment will be made on them. The questions posed by MITI in
designating the automotive industry as an industry to be encouraged epitomized
MITI's general selection criteria. It asked:
(1) Is the industry internationally competitive or capable of becoming so?
(2) Will a given amount of capital produce a world scale industry faster in
this industry than in another?
(3) Does the product have high income elasticity in world markets?
(4) Does the industry have high potential to create employment in supplier
and service industries?5
As early as October 1951, the Japanese resolved that their automotive industry
would not be merely an appendage of a foreign industry as it had been before
World War II. This goal was underscored by a policy statement 6 prohibiting
capital repatriation guarantees for foreign investments in Japan in automotive
sales organizations or assembly plants. At the same time, production in Japan by
foreign companies that contributed to Japanese technological development was
2. Adams & Ichimura, Industrial Policy in Japan, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND
COMPETITIVENESS 305 (F. Adams and L. Klein eds. 1983).
3. E. KAPLAN, JAPAN: THE GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, A GUIDE FOR THE AMERI-
CAN BUSINESSMAN 111, 114-15 (1972).
4. The view of the primacy of the motor vehicle industry continued into the 1980s. "[Ulnless [the
automotive industry] errs in coping with the changes in its environment, it will be able to maintain its
position as Japan's key industry." The Vision of MITI Policies In 1980s, Recommendation of the
Industrial Structure Council (March 1980) (unpublished).
5. Adams & Ichimura, supra note 2, at 316.
6. E. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 111-12 (discussing MITI Announcement of June 1952, entitled
Basic Policy for the Introduction of Foreign Investment into Japan's Passenger Car Industry).
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Table 2
Instruments of Industrial Policy and their Application to Japanese Automotive
Industry















Control over technology imports,
Below market-rate loans f
Subsidies to capital goods industriesg
Tax incentivesh
-export revenue tax relief
-accelerated depreciation




Local content requirements m
Exchange control on imported parts"
Withholding of repatriation guarantees for foreign
assembly and sales operationso




" single firm industry (national car competition)'
" two firm industry'
" three firm industry'
-weak-firm rescue attempts
Company subsidies and government projects
-electric car,
-ceramics,
Voluntary restrictions on export quotas'
Overseas parts procurement programsy
Stimulation of overseas investments"
Reduction of Japanese tariffs on parts-
Diplomatic pressure on raw material source
countries to accept importsb5
Market country political pressures (lobbying and
marshalling public opinion)cc
Sources: , Johncon, C., op. cit., Chapter 7.
b Duncan, op. cit., pp. 84-85 and Kaplan op. cit. p. 44.
1 Johnson, C. op. cit., p. 280.
Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 110-11I, and Johnson, C. op. cit. p. 268.
Kaplan, op. cit., p. 124.
f Phyllis A. Genther, "Japan's Industrial Policy: Effects on the Automobile Industries
Developments," (U.S. Dept. of Trans., Transportation Systems Center, Contract Study,
1981), p. 34.
Characteristic
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Table 2 (Continued)
g Ibid.
h Ibid., p. 34.
Martin Anderson, "Japan's Strategic Umbrella," (April 1981, unpublished manuscript),
pp. 85-87.
Duncan, op. cit., p. 75.





P Duncan, op. cit., Chapter 4 and p. 94.
Duncan, op. cit., pp. 96-100, Kaplan op cit. pp. 117-119.
Duncan, op. cit., p. 75.
Johnson, op. cit., pp. 287-288, Duncan, op. cit. p. 87.
Duncan, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
* Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 126-128.
* Kaplan, op. cit., p. 136.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its Effect on U.S. Industries,
Phase 1: Japan, p. 131 and H-6, October 1983.
MITI Announcement, May 1, 1981, Press Statement by Minister Uno, November 1,
1983.
y Verbal report of a meeting Sept. 8, 1980, indicating a commitment or intention for
Japanese manufacturers to procure $300 million in automotive parts in the U.S. Meeting
attended by then Under Secretary of Commerce, Robert Herzstein, and the head of the
Japanese parts buying mission, Mr. H. Takahashi, Executive VP of Nissan. The head of
the Auto Division in MITI, Mr. T. Yokoyama, was also present.
MITI Announcement of Voluntary Export Restraints, May 1, 1981, referring to an
unpublished "auto package" agreed to in May 1980 containing provision for cooperation
with the U.S. government in inter alia, the promotion of investment into the U.S. and the
elimination "in principle" of Japanese duties on auto parts. Additionally, May 1982,
Release of Government of Japan, "Positive Promotion of Industrial Cooperation,"
describing trade liberalizing measures.
,a Ibid.
b Speech and interviews with Kioyohisa Mikanagi, Japanese Ambassador at the Toronto
Star, October 20, 1983; and Yutaka Fujimoto, Commercial and Economics Counsellor,
Ottawa, Calgary Sun, May 22, 1983.
cc Christopher Madison, "Is Japan Trying to Buy Washington or Just Do Business Capital
Style?", National Journal, pp. 1710-1714, October 9, 1982.
welcomed. 7 Three years later foreign exchange for imported components was
restricted. 8
Initial attempts to direct the organization of the automotive industry involved a
1955 plan for cooperative design of a national "Peoples Car" modeled after
Volkswagen. MITI was to select a winning design and would subsidize its pro-
duction by a chosen manufacturer. The plan failed to reach the Diet as a result of
rival companies' objections to the proposed monopoly. 9
Not to be rebuffed, MITI's next move was to increase economies of scale by
reorganizing the already growing industry. In June 1956, a law was passed to
7. See W. DUNCAN, U.S.-JAPAN AUTOMOBILE DIPLOMACY 74, 145-46 (1973).
8. See id. at 75.
9. See E. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 121.
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rationalize the auto parts business, establishing an elaborate consultative mecha-
nism. 10 The companies did not use it, however. They were busy forming chains of
supplier affiliates and thus solving the problem themselves. 1
MITI continued to be concerned about the necessity of achieving economies of
scale in accordance with its perception that ten was an excessive number of
terminal automotive manufacturers. At various times through 1968, MITI tried to
encourage a two-firm industry (Toyota and Nissan) and a three-firm industry
(with Mitsubishi), attaching weaker firms to larger companies (Hino and
Daihatsu to Toyota), and a rescue merger of Nissan and Prince. This merger was
facilitated by the Japan Development Bank extending approximately $15 million
of credit. The merger was justified as an attempt to increase Japan's export
competitiveness through economies of scale. However, creditor banks were
partly responsible for the pressure to consummate the arrangement, suggesting
that more than international considerations were at stake. '2
Thus, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the focus of Japanese industrial
policy for the automotive industry was the creation of a national industry empha-
sizing economies of scale through rationalization. Significantly, the restructuring
effort was encouraged by the liberalization of international trade and investment
which MITI believed might wipe out the inefficient Japanese industry. A fairly
consistent pattern of this period was the intervention by MITI in other industries
to assist the creation of cartels by preventing antitrust action by the Japan Fair
Trade Commission. But MITI's policy favoring reduced competition among do-
mestic firms had virtually no influence on the auto industry. ' 3
In 1963, MITI introduced a Draft Law of Special Measures for Strengthening
the International Competitive Ability of Designated Industries. ' 4 A later version
of the proposed law provided for the designation of industries for special treat-
ment. It was at the heart of Japanese industrial policy even though it was never
formally adopted. The draft required industry cooperation and banking as-
sistance and provided various financial inducements and exemption from the
Anti-monopoly law. Initially, the specialty steel, auto, and petrochemical indus-
tries were designated to receive assistance. A selected three-way "discussion"
committee of bankers, industrialists, and government representatives was author-
ized to carry out "promotion standards." While the original Special Measures
proposal failed to pass the Diet because of political and personal animosities, '5 it
10. Id. at 117.
!1. See id. at 66.
12. MITI's various efforts to consolidate the Japanese automotive industry in the 1960s are de-
scribed in E. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 120-28.
13. A committee chaired by Nakayama Sohei of the Industrial Bank of Japan and with members
from MITI and EPA in 1967 called for mergers and cooperation in seven industries, including
automobiles, in order to end excessive competition and prepare for the difficulties expected from
foreign investment in Japanese industry. By that time, the structure of the automobile industry was
already fairly visible and the ability of the government to influence it was waning. See C. JOHNSON,
MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 277-78 (1982).
14. See id. at 255, 258.
15. See id. at 255, 260-63.
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established the pattern of administrative guidance that is one of the unique fea-
tures of modern Japanese industrial policy. '
6
The legal basis for this administrative guidance is contained in the laws setting
up the ministries and authorizing various forms of directives. Public response to
public policy statements also aided the administrative guidance process. 7 Typ-
ically, refusal to follow such guidance risked the threat of administrative retalia-
tion and, while the latter could be challenged in court, retaliatory measures were
in some cases sustained. ' 8 The impact of administrative guidance in the auto-
motive industry, while perhaps less than in other sectors, was not negligible.
More important was the Japanese tax system, which in general encouraged
capital intensive industries through liberal depreciation provisions. It particularly
favored enterprises relying on the chains of affiliated small business suppliers
characteristic of the Japanese automotive industry. 19 The tax incentives had their
most obvious effect on specifically targeted industries and, particularly, as a
stimulus to exports.20 A tax credit based on total overseas revenues could be
deducted (later deferred) from taxes on current income from both domestic and
foreign operations. Depreciation "kickers" notably useful for the auto industry
included a deduction of 25 percent of cost in addition to first-year normal de-
preciation for equipment, such as electronic and computer controlled machinery,
and cutting, forging, assembly, and design equipment. All of these are state-of-
the-art capital equipment for the automotive industry. 2' With the possible excep-
tion of import protection which, in the early period, prevented the domestic auto
industry from being smothered by foreign companies, the tax provisions were the
most valuable element of MITI-sponsored automotive industrial policy. 22
Opinions are mixed as to whether MITI-sponsored measures significantly
benefited the Japanese auto industry. One commentator concludes that industrial
policy measures helped the automotive industry by creating and preserving a
strong domestic market and moderating problems of a changing industrial struc-
ture. 23 Certainly, the steel industry and the machine tool industry were major
16. See id. at 265. Chalmers Johnson devotes an entire chapter of his book to administrative
guidance. See id. at 242-74.
17. Id. at 266.
18. Johnson cites the case of a housing contractor who ignored City of Musashino guidance
requiring project developers to provide land for schools. The city retaliated by capping water and
sewer lines and was upheld in court. See id. at 266.
19. M. Anderson, Japan's Strategic Umbrella 81 (April 1981) (unpublished manuscript).
20. Id. at 89.
21. Id.
22. One of the most influential tax measures assisting Japanese producers was largely unplanned.
In 1954, when a major commodity tax was proposed on passenger cars, taxi drivers lobbied to obtain
a lower tax for the smaller cars used for public conveyance which happened to be entirely Japanese
produced. The discrimination against larger cars, despite several successive rate reductions, has
continued and virtually entirely impacts vehicles from abroad. By the 1970s, of course, MITI became
a vigorous defender of the higher tax on large cars as being justified by Japan's crowded urban
environment. P. Genther, Japan's Industrial Policy: Effects on Auto Industries Developments 32
(1981) (contract study for U.S. Dep't of Transportation RTans System Center).
23. Id. at 2.
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beneficiaries of MITI policy, and they contributed heavily to the success of the
automotive industry. On the other hand, another commentator is much more
reserved regarding the contribution of industrial policy to the strength of the
general market: "[T]he impressive economic growth and social stability are not
owing in any decisive degree to microeconomic decision making . . . even
though there has been a pervasive pattern of interventions .... " 24 According to
this commentator, the strength of the market that was so important for the indus-
try's development must have come from forces outside industrial policy.
Citing the fact that MITI's prescriptions for restructuring were generally not
effective, commentators sometimes suggest that industrial policy did not work
for the Japanese automotive industry. Despite the fact that the consultative mech-
anism seems to have been much less prominent in the automotive industry than in
other industries, the opposition of the industry to the restructuring proposals did
find expression in the failure to implement major proposals. This suggests that a
give and take relationship between MITI and the industry was working outside of
formal ties. That MITI's restructuring goal was the achievement of economies of
scale which the industry in its various business combinations largely obtained
through its own efforts, does not mean the general industrial policy program was
of little effect. Numerous other elements of MITI-guided industrial policy, quite
apart from restructuring, affected the auto industry.
MITI's efforts were directed toward at least three other objectives. First, MITI
tailored trade and investment measures to create a national industry outside the
influence of the major foreign automotive firms. This was no mean feat, as
several influential companies were established in a limited way in Japan. 25 MITI's
adroit discouragement of foreign firms' assembly and import operations, plus the
existence of more easily conquered markets elsewhere, left the Japanese free to
develop independently their own domestic market.
Second, the 1963 Draft Law of Special Measures for Strengthening the Inter-
national Competitive Ability of Designated Industries had identified the auto-
motive industry for special treatment. The failure of the measure to pass the Diet
did not prevent the provision of favorable financing and tax treatment to the
industry through less formal administrative guidance and interministerial con-
sultations. This aid in amassing internal savings for its heavy investment needs
could not fail to be significant to the rapidly growing auto industry.
Much of Japan's industrial policy aimed at creating export industries that were
internationally competitive. This was the third objective of MITI's efforts in the
automotive industry. While blatant export subsidies had to be withdrawn as Japan
24. Trezise, Industrial Policy Is Not the Major Reason for Japan's Success. BROOKINGS REV., Fall
1983, at 13.
25. The Japanese chose to discourage American companies from producing in Japan by maintain-
ing limitations on imports of engines without which assembly was not practical and which could not
be economically made locally in the volumes initially anticipated. See generally W. DUNCAN, supra
note 7, at 3-42. While the companies and the U.S. Congress threatened, the American Administra-
tion's pressure on MITI was tempered by considerations of the U.S. capital outflow, which would
only have been further exacerbated by American automotive investment in Japan.
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was forced to live up to its GATT commitments,2 6 the scale of production the
incentives helped produce and the plant modernization and the development of
supplier industries they stimulated, enabled the Japanese industry to bring its
costs down rapidly relative to foreign competitors. In 1952, the best the Japanese
could do was produce the small "Toyopet" which sold for about $167 less in their
home market than a much more luxurious Ford import which had to surmount
both ocean transportation and import taxes. 27 In that year the entire Japanese
production of four-wheeled passenger cars amounted to 4,837 units, none of
which were sold abroad. 28 In 1982 Japanese passenger car exports alone totaled
nearly 3.8 million units. 29 Japanese competitiveness had grown so much that
numerous American studies show a Japanese cost advantage in the U.S. of
$1,200 to $2,500 per unit over comparable American cars on a landed cost
basis. 30
MITI's efforts may have produced a supplier base for the automotive industry
at an earlier time and a lower cost and more abundant capital structure in the
featured industry (though quite possibly at the expense of other equally desirable
industries). Its protectionist measures could well have led the local firms to reach
world scale more rapidly than they would have otherwise. The restrictions on
foreign-owned, local production facilities reserved the benefits of exploiting the
domestic market to Japanese companies. From these accomplishments some
degree of international competitiveness no doubt followed.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the development of an industry
producing an initially underutilized consumer product in a large, rapidly grow-
ing, and, ultimately, high income economy probably would have succeeded with
or without the help of an interventionist industrial policy. It might be that the
unique competitive advantages of the Japanese auto industry stemmed less from
MITI's intervention than from product engineering and design for markets, pro-
duction methods including labor relations management, and plant layouts and
logistics, over which MITI had little control. "' Intense domestic competitiveness
was not the result of MITI policies (and indeed was contrary to their initial
26. As Japanese firms increasingly developed overseas markets, blatant export subsidies had to be
eliminated to achieve full rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Opened
for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The process began in
April 1963 when Japan notified GATT it was shifting to Article XI status by agreeing not to use
quantitative restrictions for correction of balance of payments problems.
27. W. DUNCAN, supra note 7, at 72.
28. See AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASS'N, WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1970, at 16, 20
(1971).
29. See MOTOR VEHICLES MANUFACTURERS ASS'N OF THE U.S., WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA
81(1983).
30. See Abernathy, Clark & Kantrow, The New Industrial Competition, HARVARD BUS. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 68, 72; Gomez-Ibanez & Harrison, Imports and the Future of the U.S. Auto-
mobile Industry, AM. ECON. REV., May 1982, at 419-23; M. Anderson, Comparisons of Labor and
Management Costs in the Motor Vehicle Industries of Japan and the United States (1983) (Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology Future of the Automobile Program Working Draft); W. Abernathy,
J. Harbour & 1. Henn, Productivity and Comparative Cost Advantages: Some Estimates for Major
Automotive Producers (1981) (Harvard Business School Working Paper).
31. See, e.g., Burck, Can Detroit Catch-up?, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1982, at 34-39; Abernathy, Clark
& Kantrow, supra note 30, at 73-76.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 275
desires), but it must certainly have played a role in honing the competitive
abilities of the firms for battle in a world market. Furthermore, the Japanese
embarked on large-scale exports with a fuel-efficient car designed for their own
markets at precisely the time the oil crisis broke. It was a circumstance scarcely
within MITI's planning abilities that U.S. customers would suddenly turn to fuel-
efficient cars as gasoline prices soared and oil availability seemed threatened.
Furthermore, according to indices of internal performance, the industry has
been successful. Compensation for Japanese automotive laborers is apparently
higher than the national average for manufacturing workers and profits have been
satisfactory in most years by world standards. 32 It is unlikely that MITI has had
anything to do with this situation. Indeed, some of the current financial well-
being of the industry may be a result of protectionist measures in foreign markets
which have caused Japanese cars to sell at a premium. 33 That MITI fought
unsuccessfully against these limitations suggests both ineffectiveness and possi-
ble contradictions between public and private interests.
II. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Two general themes characterize European Community (EC)34 industrial pol-
icy. First and foremost is the promotion of community integration of trade,
movement of labor, prices, and standards. This involves measures which harmo-
nize the actions of member states and limit competition among them in industrial
matters. Integration within the Community also requires management of external
trade relations. Second, the economic viability of the Community is promoted by
stimulating Community-wide firms and industries to achieve otherwise difficult
to obtain economies of scale. One aspect of this is supranational cooperation
32. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS OF
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING, 14 COUNTRIES,
1975-1983 (1984); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HOURLY COMPENSATION FOR
PRODUCTION WORKERS, ALL MANUFACTURING, 1975-1983 (1984).
33. The impact of the Japanese voluntary export restraints on the price of imported passenger cars
entering the U.S. market is indicative of the impact of protection. This has been extensively studied
recently. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S. AUTO-
MOBILE INDUSTRY INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JAPANESE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT AGREE-
MENTS (1985). Wharton estimated that the average price increase of a Japanese car in the U.S. was
$851 from 1981 to 1982. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Assocs., Wharton Motor Vehicle
Service 32 (Feb. 1983) (Special Analysis: The Japanese Quota). Feenstra estimated the increase as
much less, 3.1 percent or about $200. His calculation was based, however, on a determination that
quality improvement accounted for two-thirds of the total price increase. See Feenstra, Voluntary
Export Restraint in U.S. Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment, and Welfare Effects, in THE STRUC-
TURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 35, 56 (R. Baldwin & A. Krueger eds.
1984).
34. This article uses the term European Community in accordance with the resolution of the
European Parliament. Resolution on a single designation for the Community, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 63) 36 (1978). The European Community was formed in 1957. See freaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Treaty of Rome]. The six original Member States were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany), France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom joined the Community on January 1, 1973. Greece became the tenth Member State on
January I, 1981. Finally, in 1985, Spain and Portugal became Member States.
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among members in matters of industrial cooperation, technology, and cross-
border adjustment policies.35
The Community's industrial policy has grown in stature most conspicuously as
a result of its success in tackling the problem of excess steel production and
achieving some agreement among the member states to reduce capacity. The
powers in this area have been reinforced by the Commission's ruling of October
30, 1980,36 imposing fines for violation of production quotas which was upheld
by a 1983 decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 37 While there have
been occasional suggestions that the Community may face an overproduction
capacity problem in the motor vehicle industry similar to that which it faced in
the steel industry, EC policy has nevertheless encouraged or stimulated the
industry rather than facilitated adjustment to lower volume levels.
The basic documentation for the application of EC industrial policies to the
automotive industry is the statement on the European Automobile Industry of
June 1981 (Statement 1981). It identifies the four major aspects of EC industrial
policy as (1) strengthening the internal market; (2) furthering the structural devel-
opment of the industry; (3) changing employment; and (4) maintaining a di-
alogue with the Community's trading partners. 38 A 1983 report, following up on
the 1981 document, succinctly describes the Commission's overall objective as
creating conditions within which the auto industry "would develop and apply the
best possible strategies for adopting the requirements of the future and for re-
maining competitive at the world level." 39
Perhaps the most identifiable automotive-directed internal policy has been
removal of impediments to a united market within the Community. While many
of these efforts involve harmonizing manufacturing standards, an area not usually
considered part of industrial policy, some efforts directly affect trade. Dif-
ferences in car prices between member countries 4° have caught the Commission's
attention, and efforts are being made to reduce the barriers permitting these price
35. Draft speech by P. Defraigne, Chef de Cabinet of the European Economic Community, entitled
Industrial Policies in the EEC, for the Meeting of the American-European Community Association,
Nice, France (1983) [hereinafter cited as Defraigne speech].
36. The decision established a system of steel production quotas for undertakings in the iron and
steel industry. See Commission Dec. No. 2794/80/ECSC, 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 291) 1 (1980).
37. Klockner-Werke, a West German steel producer, was ordered by the Commission to pay fines
of about DM 23.9 million ($8.6 million) for breaching EC crisis regulations. The ECJ upheld that
ruling. See Klockner-Werke AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 4143; see also European Court tells Kloeckner it must pay Commission fine, Fin. Times, Dec.
15, 1983, at 2.
38. Comm'n of the European Communities, Commission Statement on the European Automobile
Industry, BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 2/81, at 6-9.
39. Comm'n of the European Communities, Commission Activities and EC Rules for the Auto-
mobile Industry 1981/1983, Progress Report on the Implementation of the Commission's Statement
"the European Automobile Industry" of June 1981, at 5 (December 1983) (Mimeo) [hereinafter cited
as Progress Report].
40. Industrial passenger car models were priced before taxes on average above Belgium (100) at
112 for France, 115 for Germany, and 138 for the U.K., according to an October 1983 survey. See
Bureau European des Unions de Consommateurs, reprinted in ICC Bus. WORLD, Jan.-Mar. 1984, at
9.
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differences. 41 Statement 1981 suggests the unification of the internal market will
spawn the dynamics needed to reorganize and rationalize the industry. Somewhat
less ambitious is the Community's sponsorship and subsidization of auto-related
research including projects in raw materials, ceramics, engines, biomechanical
subjects, fuel savings, and fuel substitutions. The total of research and develop-
ment expenditure on automotive matters is approximately 10 million ECUs (Eu-
ropean Currency Units) ($9.1 million).42
The Commission's concern with the industry's structure represents more tradi-
tional industrial policy. Statement 1981 identified the fragmentation of the Euro-
pean automotive industry, particularly in the parts and components sector, as a
major problem. The Commission associates the reduced efficiency and com-
petitiveness typical of smaller European plants with the existence of state grants
and loans, and accordingly has set up a monitoring system. "The Commission's
overall policy is to increase the transparency of national aid to industry, and thus
to help avoid the appearance of surplus capacity arising which could subse-
quently lead to protectionist measures and state aid liable to distort competition
and to interfere with free [product] movement." ' 43
The Commission does not publish figures on member governments' financial
support to the industry but it did report Community funds in the form of loans of
97.8 million ECUs and grants of 32.6 million ECUs to the automobile sector in
1981 and 1982 combined. 44 The motor vehicle and components sectors were the
largest ultimate manufacturing industry beneficiaries of the EC's Regional Fund
in 1981. In its description of some of these loans from the "New Community
Instrument," it indicates that components manufacturers should benefit, particu-
larly small or medium-sized enterprises. This suggests that the Community's own
aid program did not necessarily further its industrial policy aim of reducing the
number of sub-optimal-sized suppliers.
The role of the Commission in trade policy reveals another way that the
Community may be able to bring about some restructuring of the European
automotive industry. The Community's role in trade policy stems from its dele-
gated power to speak for member countries as a group in trade negotiations. To a
lesser degree the Commission derives some power from its ability to enforce
origin rules. 45 The Commission has powers to force member governments and
41. These barriers include (1) local dealer control over type certification and inspection procedures,
allegedly making cross-border arbitrage difficult and expensive; (2) refusal of producer companies to
sell right-hand drive cars to continental dealers for resale to British customers visiting the continent;
and (3) assistance to national governments in obtaining information to help eliminate transfer price
differences between countries which distort the flow of new car sales.
As this is written, the status of the Commission's efforts is unclear. Ford Werke of West Germany
halted sales of right-hand drive cars to its continental dealers, but the European Court of Justice gave
an interim order to Ford to continue to supply the cars. However, the manufacturer declined in
February 1984, arguing that a 1982 order by the Commission exceeded its powers. Presently, written
agreements limiting dealership sales power are at issue under the Treaty of Rome and the auto
industry is trying to obtain block exemptions for itself. See Fin. Times, Feb. 29, 1984, at 2.
42. See Progress Report, supra note 39, at 31-36.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. at Tables 27a and 27b.
45. See generally id.; Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, at art. 115.
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industries into taking certain internal measures if they seek Community as-
sistance in trade matters, such as reducing Japanese penetration. Thus, Pierre
Defraigne, Chef de Cabinet of the EC, notes:
The producers are anxious for effective Community protection against Japanese
imports, given the limited success of the bilateral understandings. The Commission
is making this conditional on the unification of the internal market being completed
by the adoption of provisions for Community type-approval of vehicles from third
countries, to be implemented of course in line with the commercial policy agreed
on jointly. It is also encouraging cooperation on components (engines, transmis-
sions, accessories).'
The tying of restraints on Japanese imports to internal EC industry restructur-
ing was specifically recognized in a report to the Council in December 1983 on
products determined to be import-sensitive, including motor vehicles. However,
no agreement was reached other than noting the Community's responsibility for
the economic environment.
47
Community actions on automotive trade, as indicated above, are heavily but
not entirely focused on four aspects of Japanese imports: (1) direct penetration of
national markets; (2) uneven application of restraints by individual member coun-
tries and traditional non-member markets; (3) trade deflection from North Amer-
ica; and (4) access to Japanese markets by EC exports. The most visible evidence
of this aspect of industrial policy has been the creation of "retrospective monitor-
ing" of Japanese shipment to the EC of a number of sensitive products including
video tape recorders (VTRs) and passenger cars. The special cases of Spanish
and Portuguese motor vehicle production, and Japanese investment in European
and non-European markets are also subjects of Community interest in trade
discussions. One aspect of general community industrial policy applied to the
motor vehicle industry is a Community procurement preference system favoring
EC-made vehicles purchased by government contracts or through participation in
Community-financed projects.
48
The European Community's industrial policy, at least for the automotive indus-
try, in some respects represents a much different program than most national
programs. For example, the major goal, that of achieving unimpeded sales of cars
across the Community regardless of origin, is scarcely of concern to individual
nations with respect to their domestic markets. This goal may be achieved in part
through extracting concessions from individual member states (and their pro-
ducers) in return for Community assistance in restraining Japanese imports. It is
by no means clear, however, that such bargains have been completed. Thus, the
linkage of protective measures with positive (not predatory) goals puts some
redeeming quality on the Community's program. The fruits of other, more tradi-
tional, goals of industrial policy such as technological development, restructur-
ing of the industry for greater efficiency, and joint endeavors to create economies
of scale are not yet visible even though they are on the Commission agenda.
The lack of strong efforts in the Community's industrial policy for the auto-
46. See Defraigne speech, supra note 35.
47. See Progress Report, supra note 39, at 46.
48. See A nasty disease in Brussels, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1983, at 72.
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motive industry probably arises in part from the less-than-desperate circum-
stances of the industry in most of the member states. Only in the United Kingdom
and perhaps France is there obvious distress not related to cyclical factors in the
auto market. 49 While Japanese imports, if unconstrained, would be increasing in
Europe, the Community's motor vehicle industry does not have the structural
problems of the type thought to be appropriate for industrial policy solutions.
U.S. firms have made major investments recently in European production facili-
ties, both within and outside the Community. 50 The shift on the part of some
companies from domestic to continental (EC) plants in order to supply passenger
cars to British buyers illustrates that rigidities are not present in the system.
Finally, while it is possible that European makers are not competitive in the
sector of the market dominated by the Japanese, Community exports to non-EC
countries amounted to 1.7 million vehicles in 1981. 51 Thus, even though its costs
may not be comparatively low, the EC still maintains a high degree of interna-
tional competitiveness, whether through style, quality, or tradition.
III. FRANCE
In recent years, the member states of the EC have all intervened in the private
sector in various forms. While some observers would suggest that the actions of
the ten individual member countries were manifestations of industrial policy,
most do not measure up to the principal criteria for such a regime suggested in
the introduction. The micro policy measures are not part of an integrated overall
program. France, where a coordinated program involving specific industry inter-
ventions has existed since World War II, is an exception.
France practices industrial policy with some advantages since legislation or
specific authorization is less necessary than in other countries. In practice, all
actions of significance by industry are disclosed to the government in advance.
While the process of formal application and approval is not always involved, the
use of consultation undoubtedly influences the actions of industry.
The French dirigiste system is sufficiently informal and non-specific to raise
the question of whether industrial policy may not be largely an exercise in
rhetoric, short on action and long on description. However, the various periods of
policy seem fairly complete and well defined. Le Plan, as French Development
Plans have been known since they were initiated in 1945, over the years incorpo-
rated various phases: the rebuilding of the basic economy to 1958, the mainte-
nance of French ownership to 1976, and, more recently, the adjustment to slow
49. European specialty car makers (Saab, Volvo, BMW, and Daimler-Benz) have continued to be
profitable, and even Fiat turned a small profit in the latest year. This is in spite of major losses by
Ford, GM, Renault, Peugeot, and Volkswagon. Continued profits of some European companies plus
the general ability of European firms to stay current on product and manufacturing technology
suggest the industry has not generally suffered from obsolescence or lack of ability to compete.
50. Ford Espana, Almusafes (Valencia) began production in October 1976. General Motors Aus-
tria Ges. mbh, Aspern (Vienna) and General Motors Espana, S.A., Zaragossa and Cadiz began
production in May 1982 and August 1982 respectively.
51. See Progress Report, supra note 39, at Annex 13.
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economic growth conditions.52 While facts are hard to obtain on the explicit
manner in which government guides industry, some obvious cases have occurred
in the automotive area.
Prior to 1976, the emphasis, according to government statements, was on
creating broad-based industrial corporations for achievement of economies of
scale, retaining national ownership of industry, achieving self-sufficiency in en-
ergy, and fostering high technology. French industrial policy apparently suc-
ceeded in restructuring the automotive sector, although the rationalization was
more of a rescue operation than the deliberate merger of healthy firms. Renault
had been nationalized at the end of World War II, as a result of the owners'
collaboration with Germany. " Since that time, the firm has been run as a state
enterprise with a board consisting of government officials and company employ-
ees. The other major company, PSA Peugeot-Citr6en, was formed in 1974 by
merging distressed Citrben into Peugeot in return for government arranged
financing. In 1978, with government encouragement, PSA purchased Talbot,
Chrysler's faltering European subsidiary, which included French, British, and
Spanish passenger and commercial vehicle operations. The weak French domes-
tic commercial vehicle operations were shored up by a Renault takeover of Berliet
adding to its own line and its Saviem operation. This was followed by a Renault
purchase of a 22.5 percent equity in American Motors Corporation and a 20
percent share of Mack Truck. Thus, there are at present two large French com-
panies, each with broad product lines of passenger cars and commercial vehicles
and each with international connections. 
54
French industrial planning in the automotive industry seems to be largely a
policy of reaction to specific events. Thus, the government may be consulted on a
plant location matter or a reduction in work force. Trade policy is also quick to
challenge an import threat: the Japanese have been limited by administrative
action to three percent of the market. 55 Even under the Socialists, however, the
industry is largely free from government intervention so long as the broad out-
lines of the Plan are not challenged.
Although from the end of the rebuilding phase to 1976 the Plan's emphasis was
apparently on retaining French ownership of industry and assisting exports, the
general economic goal of full employment tended to override any strategy of
sectoral industrial policy. This changed with the coming of the Barre government
in 1976 when the government began to place less emphasis on its direction of
industry and to rely more on the private sector. At that time, the philosophy
encouraged adaptation to achieve competitiveness. Costs were lowered by creat-
ing larger units, more capital, less labor, or better management. The so-called
Albert's theorem, named after Commissaire du Plan, Michael Albert, became the
52. Dewitt, French Industrial Policy from 1945-1981: An Assessment, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
FOR GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS 222 (F Adams and L. Klein eds. 1983).
53. The truth of this charge is disputed. See W. NELSON, SMALL WONDER: THE AMAZING STORY
OF THE VOLKSWAGEN 103 (1965).
54. K. BHASKAR, THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD MOTOR INDUSTRY 143-47 (1980).
55. This limit is said to have originated as a result of a remark by General DeGaulle which became
translated into practice by the French customs service. It illustrates typical French "administrative
guidance."
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guiding philosophy: "Employment comes from growth, growth comes from
exports, exports come from industrial adaptation." 56 Despite the change in phi-
losophy, the underlying conditions and political realities of the time forced Barre,
against his philosophy, to intervene even more than his predecessors to support
industries in distress. 57 The Socialists since their rise to power in 1981 apparently
have not changed this direction. Indeed they seem to have fostered further indus-
trial adjustment, sometimes with fairly harsh effects. The stormy workforce
reductions of spring 1984 at Peugeot's Talbot and Citroen plants bear the clear
imprint of the French industrial policy goal of improving competitiveness.
A partial explanation for the ill-defined treatment of France's automotive in-
dustry as part of broader national industrial policy is that the French have never
given priority to industries that were reasonably competitive. 58 While industrial
planning in the automotive industry seems to be a collection of moves to improve
chances of survival, they were not merely unguided reactions. The major com-
panies have been led to absorb the minor ones. The units are now bigger and
therefore in theory more efficient.
The aims of French automotive industrial policy, as this description suggests,
are more easily articulated than attained. Most of the moves made by the govern-
ment were reactions to financial weaknesses of the national firms rather than fresh
starts in restructuring the industry. Nevertheless, the rescue and survival meas-
ures have not deviated in direction from the overall blueprint. In dealing with the
automotive industry, the government authorities have linked assistance to desired
structural changes, using financing as a means of persuasion at critical times.
Consolidation and rationalization is a natural strategy for such times. The more
imaginative aspects of industrial policy mentioned in the planning documents,
such as new production techniques, and product improvements, seem to have
been more elusive perhaps because they often are not immediately related to
survival.
In pursuing industrial policy France has been unable to use import protection
of the automotive industry as effectively as other countries. The most important
current restriction limits Japanese vehicle imports to three percent of the French
market. Also France and EC members generally have kept moderately high
passenger car and truck tariffs. However, the importance of avoiding retaliation
by other European countries and maintaining EC and European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) trade commitments, precludes France from shutting off its market
56. DeWitt, supra note 52, at 230.
57. See id. This view may be deceptive. A recent study by the Economist Intelligence Unit of the
European and Japanese components industries notes recent French objectives to improve the interna-
tional competitiveness of their national industry and prevent foreign penetration by restructuring
around two companies have been implemented through government-approved acquisitions. See
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STUDY OF
THE AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS INDUSTRY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND JAPAN 213 (1981).
58. See C. STOFFAES, LE GRANDE MENACE INDUSTRIELLE 163 (1978) (T. Atkinson, S. Erzati & J.
Flynn trans.) Stoffaes, the head of industrial strategy studies of the French Ministry of Industry,
notes: "France must do everything to preserve the chances of its automotive industry and in particular
it must end its attitude of benign neglect which it has also had for its major industrial success, because
in a sense the automobile has developed by itself without any industrial policy." See also DeWitt,
supra note 52, at 242-44.
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to its greatest rivals, European producers. Thus, import protection has not been
used as vigorously for industry promotion as in some other countries.
Industrial policy has touched the French automotive industry only lightly
probably because the industry itself has not suffered prolonged distress. State
intervention has occurred only once because of financial problems. 5 9 Ranked by
production volume, Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citr6en are rated sixth and seventh
in the world. While both companies have had periods of unprofitability, there is
no reason to view them as generally unprofitable. The number of workers in the
French motor vehicle industry has increased. This stands in contrast to the
decline in overall employment in French industry and shrinking employment in
the British and Italian automotive industries. 60 Currently, operation of the French
automotive industry is little affected by industrial policy even though the present
structure of the industry is a creation of such policy.61
IV. BRAZIL
As a result of a balance of payments crisis during the late 1940s, a set of
programs which can properly be described as industrial policy was instituted in
Brazil. At that time the government, which had become increasingly disposed
toward intervening in economic affairs, responded to the crisis by restricting
imports. 62 Moreover, a new constitution ratified in 1946 specifically authorized
government intervention in the economy and established the National Economic
59. The French Government in 1974 provided a $51 million rescue loan to provide for Peugeot to
take over Citroen and Renault to take over Berliet. This was seen as an obvious rationalization to
complete the product lines of each producer with acquisitions of manufacturing facilities that were
then experiencing trouble. See K. BHASKAR, supra note 54, at 143, 146.
60. See Progress Report, supra note 39, at Annex 25.
61. Since the final version of this article was completed, a study commissioned by the French
Government has been released. The Commission, according to press reports, recommended a restruc-
turing of the French automotive industry along the lines of the Japanese auto industry, which would
encompass labor force reductions, government-supported financing and an overhaul of production
methods. Since 1979, Renault and Peugeot combined have experienced a six percent drop in their
share of the domestic market. The Commission recommended that the government relax price
controls on cars to permit the manufacturers to raise prices by about three percent on the domestic
market and suggested that Renault and Peugeot each introduce a new model each year.
The study also recommended that the government advance low interest loans to Renault and
Peugeot of the equivalent of $638 million per year for each of the next three years to help finance the
needed investment, which should reach a level equal to $4 billion in 1986-87. The recommended 30
percent reduction in the combined workforce by 1988 would be accomplished by early retirements
and repatriation of "guest" workers. In addition, the study recommended a 16.4 percent cut in jobs in
supplier industries. The report recommended government-supported retraining and relocation pro-
grams to ease the resultant unemployment problem.
This report was commissioned by the government in the summer of 1984 under the auspices of the
government-established National Industry Commission. The publication of the report was delayed
several times because of reported objections to the Commission's recommendation on reductions in
the workforce and the massive injection of funds by the government. See Report urges 74,000 job
cuts to rescue French car industry, Fin. Times, Oct. 20, 1984, at 32.
62. See generally R. DALAND, BRAZILIAN PLANNING: DEVELOPMENT PoLmcs AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION 22-23 (1967); S. ROBOCK, BRAZIL: A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 13, 24-26
(1975).
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Council, a new planning agency. 63 This institutionalized a shift away from Bra-
zil's prewar industrialization phase, during which there was no concerted effort
by the government to promote the development of local industry, and ushered in
an era of import-substitution in Brazil, which lasted until the late 1960s. Even-
tually, these policies developed into more comprehensive planning schemes ori-
ented toward the development of particular sectors of the economy and the
stimulation of general economic growth. The industrial sectors that constituted
the primary focus of the government's attention included consumer durables,
basic intermediate goods, and capital goods.
Brazilian efforts to develop and implement industrial policy have exhibited a
substantial degree of pragmatism and have not been motivated by a rigid statist
ideology. 64 The political circumstances during which these policies emerged,
however, have typically been dominated by national crises. Thus, Brazilian in-
dustrial policy has been colored by nationalistic sentiment. Indeed, the institu-
tional basis for the development of industrial policy was established in response
to two cataclysmic events: the Great Depression and World War II. While in-
creased governmental intervention in the economy during these periods was
occasionally prompted by specific economic problems, for example, difficulties
faced by the private sector in obtaining capital goods during World War 11,6
justification of such measures more frequently involved an appeal for the rein-
forcement of national security.
66
The government's first major effort to implement some form of industrial
policy occurred in 1947. It imposed an import licensing scheme to control the
level and composition of imports. 67 Initially, the government's objective was to
reduce imports to ease the balance of payments crisis; 68 protection for specific
industries and the encouragement of new industries was a secondary objective. In
1949 the movement toward increased protectionism became more pronounced as
the government resuscitated a little used law that had been enacted in 1911, the
Law of Similars. 69 This law virtually prohibited the public sector and firms that
wanted to qualify for government assistance from importing goods for which
domestic substitutes were available. 7" The effort to limit imports was further
enhanced when a multi-tiered exchange rate system was instituted in 1953, and
again in 1957 when stringent tariff protection was imposed. "
However, by the mid 1960s the Brazilian Government realized that import
substitution policies were too restrictive and had the effect of constraining rather
than promoting economic growth. Consequently, during the late 1960s and
63. See S. RoBOCK, supra note 62, at 25 (discussing Article 146 of the Brazilian Constitution).
64. See R. DALAND, supra note 62, at 12; S. ROBOCK, supra note 62, at 41, 56.
65. See N. LEFF, THE BRAZILIAN CAPITAL GOODS INDUSTRY 14-15 (1968).
66. For example, initial support for government intervention in the steel industry during the 1930s
came from the military. N. LEFF, ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL,
1947-1964, at 47-48 (1968).
67. See S. ROBOCK, supra note 62, at 27.
68. See N. LEFF, supra note 66, at 14-15.
69. For a brief discussion of Brazil's import policy during this period and The Law of Similars, see
B. BALASSA, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 231 (1981).
70. Id.; see also S. ROBOCK, supra note 62, at 27.
71. See S. ROBOCK, supra note 62, at 27.
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throughout the 1970s, the government reformed industrial policies to make ex-
port growth the primary focus of attention. Import restrictions remained intact,
but numerous incentives were offered to industries to promote exports. Fre-
quently, these "incentives" merely compensated for the distorting effects of the
import restrictions.
The pattern of increasing import restrictions throughout the 1950s and early
1960s, and then increasing efforts to promote exports, is clearly visible in the
automotive industry. In the early 1950s, the Brazilian Government began to
develop plans to target the automotive industry as one of the principle sources of
industrial development. Under the Kubitschek Government (1956-1961) specific
measures were introduced to achieve this objective.72
A series of presidential decrees issued in the mid-fifties established the legal
framework for government involvement in the development of the Brazilian
automotive industry. The first decree, issued on June 16, 1956, set forth the
general policy objectives and created the executive bodies responsible for imple-
menting the specific measures of subsequent decrees. 73 It indicated that the
government perceived the automotive industry as one of the key sectors of the
economy and that the forthcoming regulations would be structured so as to use
the automotive industry as a means of stimulating economic growth in general.
The most important specific feature contained in the first decree was the
creation of the Automotive Industry Executive Group (GEIA), which was
charged with responsibility for formulating automotive plans (which were subject
to the approval of the President), examining and approving automotive industry
projects, and supervising the execution of those policies.
74
Vehicle manufacturers were required to submit production programs to the
GEIA and, if approved, the manufacturers could be granted "reasonable access"
to imports of inputs necessary for production. The GEIA had substantial discre-
tionary powers in this matter. The decree stated that these import allowances
would depend on the "degree of economic interest" the particular automotive
products were deemed to possess, subject to the interpretation of the GEIA. The
specific allowances that would be granted to vehicle manufacturers included
easier access to foreign exchange and the favorable classification of imported
component parts.7 5 The decree declared that automotive projects were to be
considered part of the "basic industries," making them eligible for special cred-
its and guarantees by official financial institutions. 76 It also specified the general
criteria that were to be employed by the GEIA when considering automotive
industry projects for approval. 
77
72. See N. LEFF, supra note 66, at 52.
73. See Decreto No. 39.412, 1956 Coleqo das Leis [Coleg5o], Vol. IV (junho) - Exec.
74. See id. at arts. 14, 16.
75. See id. at art. 5, para. 1.
76. See id. at art. 11.
77. In particular, Article 8 indicated that one of the most important objectives of government
policy toward the automotive industry was to help develop an indigenous supplier industry. Article 8
therefore instructed the GEIA to view favorably those projects that made intensive use of subcontrac-
tors for the specialized production of vehicle parts.
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More specific regulations for the automotive industry were contained in subse-
quent decrees issued in 1956-58.78 Their most important feature was the phase-in
of vehicle local content requirements, rising from 50 to 95 percent over three
years for passenger cars and from 35 to 90 percent over four years for trucks. 79
A principal characteristic of Brazilian industrial policy is the use of incentives
to guide resource allocation to particular sectors, as well as regulations and
prohibitions such as those listed above. For example, the automotive decrees
provided for certain foreign exchange benefits to those automotive manufacturers
who fulfilled the commitments established in the regulations.
Initially, the policies designed to protect the infant automotive industry in
Brazil did result in the development of the local vehicle industry. Multinational
automotive corporations jumped the trade barriers by establishing local produc-
tion facilities. 8 0 In addition, the influx of new foreign direct investment undoubt-
edly contributed to Brazilian economic growth throughout the late fifties and
early sixties. However, the distorting effects of Brazilian commercial policies
eventually emerged by the mid-sixties. Specifically, the Brazilian automotive
industry exhibited overcapacity and a high cost structure which rendered local
manufacturers incapable of competing effectively in international markets. 81 The
inability to compete globally compounded the efficiency problem by preventing
firms from gaining access to a larger market that would lead to economies of
scale. Moreover, the pervasive use of import substitution policies resulted in a
poor competitive position for the Brazilian manufacturing industries in general.
Consequently, the focus of Brazilian industrial policy shifted in the late 1960s
from import substitution to export promotion. The new approach typically did
not entail the dismantling of import barriers; rather, it extended export incentives
which provided some compensation for the high cost structure imposed by trade
barriers. 82
In addition to shifting from import substitution to export promotion during the
late sixties, Brazilian industrial policy became less an ad hoc effort to deal with
balance of payments problems and more a comprehensive and deliberate effort to
target and develop particular industries. The increased comprehensiveness of
Brazilian industrial policy is reflected in a series of decrees issued between
1969-1972. Although these decrees were not aimed solely at the automotive
78. The national plan for the truck segment of the auto industry was presented first in Decreto No.
39.568, 1956 Coleq~o, Vol. VI (julho) - Exec. The national plans for the light truck and passenger car
sectors followed. See Decreto No. 39.676-A, 1956 Coleqdo, Vol. VI (julho) - Exec. (light trucks);
Decreto No. 41.018, 1957 Coleqdo, Vol. II (fevereiro) - Exec. (passenger cars).
79. Local content requirements refers to the mandatory use of locally made parts in vehicle
assembly and manufacture.
80. Major companies that had been participants in Brazil on a built-up basis or assembly from kits
(CKD) went into full-scale manufacturing. These included General Motors, Ford, Volkswagen, and
Chrysler. Since the early 1960s, Chrysler has withdrawn as a manufacturer of passenger cars and Fiat
has entered the Brazilian market, building a plant there in the early 1970s.
81. See generally J. BEHRMAN, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICAN
INTEGRATION 136 (1972).
82. The most important export promotion program is the BEFIEX program, described infra notes
88-92 and accompanying text.
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industry, they nevertheless had a significant impact on the structure and function-
ing of the industry.
For example, one decree outlined the comprehensive objectives of Brazilian
industrial policy, including improvement in the domestic and international com-
petitiveness of Brazilian industry; acceleration of the rate of growth of employ-
ment; establishment of new industries, especially those in the high-tech field; and
the development of new export industries. 8 3 In order to implement these objec-
tives, the Industrial Development Council was established.14 This body was
presided over by the Minister of Industry and Commerce and its membership
included various other governmental ministers, as well as representatives from
the financial, industrial, and commercial sectors. The Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces was also included on the membership list, indicating that national security
concerns were still motivating the development and implementation of industrial
policy. The Industrial Development Council was given responsibility for peri-
odically reviewing industrial sectors, establishing priority areas, and providing
sanctions for the implementation of industrial programs.85 The Council was set
up with eleven executive groups, each of which was responsible for specific
industrial activities. Group Two was given responsibility for the automotive
industry. 86
Decree-law 767, issued concurrently, established a variety of tax and credit
incentives to promote industrial development.8 7 These incentives were made
available only for industrial development projects which were approved by the
appropriate Executive Group of the Industrial Development Council. One of the
principal production incentives granted by the decree was the exemption from
import taxes and duties of machinery, equipment, parts, appliances, and instru-
ments for which there were no Brazilian substitutes.
In 1972, decree-law 1.219 created a special export program, known by the
acronym BEFIEX, and instituted new incentives to promote industrial develop-
ment, facilitate the transfer of technology, and expand foreign trade.88 This
decree represented a sharp departure from earlier policy measures to promote
import substitution, although the export incentives were essentially just a form of
partial compensation for the distortions accompanying the import restrictions.
The special export programs instituted by the Brazilian Government entitled
participating manufacturers to exemptions from import taxes and the Indus-
trialized Products Tax.8 9 To qualify for the incentives, manufacturers were re-
quired to submit an export program and a list of imports they needed (including
both price and quantity information) to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
and the Customs Policy Council. The value of the imported goods that could be
covered by the incentive provisions was limited to one-third of the net value of the
83. Decreto No. 65.016, art. 2, 1969 Coleqfo, Vol. VI (ag6sto) - Exec.
84. Id. at art. 3.
85. Id. at art. 4.
86. Id. at art. 8.
87. Decreto-Lei No. 767, 1969 ColeqAo, Vol. V (ag6sto) - Leg.
88. Decreto-Lei No. 1.219, 1972 ColegAo, Vol. III (maio) - Leg.
89. Id. at art. 1.
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firm's annual average exports of manufactured products. 90 In order to stimulate
increased demand for Brazilian services, the program stipulated that the calcula-
tion of the value of a firm's exports would include insurance and freight charges
to the extent that Brazilian insurers and shippers were used. 91 The program was
structured in a rather pragmatic and flexible fashion; in particular, firms par-
ticipating in the same BEFIEX program were allowed to transfer goods imported
under the BEFIEX benefits among themselves.
92
A particular benefit for automobile manufacturers participating in a BEFIEX
program was the relaxation of local content requirements. The new regulations
required that automobile manufacturers who did not participate in a BEFIEX
program (and satisfy their export commitments) would be subject to a minimum
local content of 95 percent (of value rather than weight) for all classifications of
vehicles. However, if the manufacturer joined a BEFIEX program, they would be
subject to a more favorable minimum local content schedule.
To participants in the Brazilian automotive industry during the 1970s, the
pattern of industrial policy appeared fairly simple. Credit, import, and price
controls were used to vary the sales and production levels of the automotive
industry in accordance with desired goals of general economic stabilization. In
the case of policy goals affecting the industrial structure, investment was directed
into desired activities such as exporting through government control over capital
goods imports and relief from the extremely high tariffs on such goods. Com-
panies were allowed to expand production capacity to maintain a desired share of
the domestic market only so long as they increased exports. As long as exchange
rate depreciation offset rising manufacturing costs, the export potential of such
expanded facilities seemed quite realizable as production volumes approached
world scale. Thus, the opportunity to participate in the robust growth of the
Brazilian market provided a strong incentive for automotive companies to com-
ply with industrial policy measures as a condition for enlarging their operations.
But there was also a negative side to Brazilian industrial policy as it affected
the automotive industry. Until the late 1970s, when national production ap-
proached one million vehicles annually, manufacturers' inability to reach op-
timum production volume and variety imposed a welfare loss for local
consumers. Moreover, the costs of vehicle production tended to be high relative
to international norms because of the protected supplier industries' high cost
structure. 93 In addition, the prices of passenger cars were maintained at ar-
tificially high levels because they were subject to high value-added and excise
taxes. It followed that the demand-side distortion in resource allocation that
results from artificially high prices hindered the development of other industries,
especially those industries that must also exploit economies of scale to produce
efficiently, by reducing the demand for their output. 94
90. Id. at art. 3.
91. Id. at art. 3, para. 3.
92. Id. at art. 9.
93. Throughout the 1960s, the Brazilian cost for manufacturing automotive products was approx-
imately 1.7 times the international level. See J. BARANSON, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOP-
ING CouNrREs 35 (1969).
94. For a more general discussion of the economy-wide effects of protectionism in Brazil, see B.
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Furthermore, other industries were injured by the supply-side distortion that
occurred as the protected automotive and supplier industries drew resources
(capital, labor, and production inputs) from other sectors of the economy. The
Brazilian trade balance was quite possibly worsened as well. It is therefore not
surprising that many of the industrial policy measures undertaken in the last 15
years have been designed to offset the distorting effects of the initial import
restrictions. However, while Brazil has been slow to ease the import barriers
(indeed, they are currently restrictive because of the payments crisis) and to give
up general export incentives, the enlargement of the domestic market for the
Brazilian automotive industry resulted in increasing economies of scale and more
efficient production, which enabled it to become internationally competitive.
V. MEXICO
Mexican industrial policy has for many years been based on an import-sub-
stitution strategy aimed primarily at the manufacturing sector and some
agricultural areas, such as grain production. However, in the 1970s the govern-
ment's industrial policy began to include efforts to promote exports. Throughout
the post-war period, the Mexican Government has developed industrial policy in
the belief that national economic planning is necessary for the nation to realize its
economic growth potential, increase employment, strengthen its balance of pay-
ments, and reduce its economic dependence on imports. The government also
seeks to facilitate labor mobility by socializing the adjustment costs associated
with the movement from an agrarian to an industrial economy and the physical
transfer of labor from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors. 95
The Mexican Government first undertook comprehensive measures to restruc-
ture and develop the domestic automotive industry in 1962 when it issued an
automotive decree. This decree established a variety of performance require-
ments and other protectionist measures to stimulate import substitution. Specifi-
cally, the decree imposed a local content requirement of 60 percent of direct
vehicle cost, 96 equivalent to approximately 36 percent of vehicle value at interna-
tional price levels. 97 It also subjected vehicle imports to licensing requirements
and tariffs ranging from 100 to 150 percent, prohibited the import of assembled
vehicles beginning in 1964, and established individual and industry-wide produc-
tion quotas.
BALASSA, supra note 69, at 232-34. For a discussion of the bias such policies introduce against
exports, see N. LEFF, supra note 66, at 91.
95. See generally T. KING, MEXICO-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADE POLICIES SINCE 1940, at
I 1(1970); see also MINISTRY OF NATIONAL RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, I MEX-
ICO: NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 14-15, 144-46 (1979); C. FORD, PAST DEVELOP-
MENTS AND FUTURE TRENDS IN MEXICAN AUTOMOTIVE POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED
STATES-MEXICO TRADE RELATIONS 12-13, 21-22 (APRIL 1980) (DRAFT PAPER BY MOTOR VEHICLE
MANUFACTURERS ASS'N).
96. See R. JENKINS, DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND MEXICO 54 (1977) (discussing the decree of August 25,
1962).
97. Id. at 228.
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These requirements were enforced flexibly. For example, the production quota
could be increased if a manufacturer exhibited a strong export performance,
increased its local content above the required levels, or reduced the difference
between its Mexican and international vehicle prices. In addition to enforcing the
decree requirements with some flexibility, the Mexican Government, through
another decree in 1963, extended certain incentives to vehicle manufacturers who
complied with the government's plan. These incentives included import duty
exemptions on machinery and equipment for five years and raw materials, com-
ponents, and parts for four years. Also, the federal assembly tax was reduced by
80 percent for those firms that complied with the government's regulations.98
The 1962 decree was superseded by a decree issued in 1972, which principally
featured a requirement that automobile manufacturers within ten years increase
their export of automotive products sufficiently to compensate for parts and
component imports. 99 As an incentive to increase exports, the government pro-
vided for a tax rebate equivalent to 11 percent of the value of a firm's exports of
automotive products. 100 At the same time, measures to reduce overcapacity were
instituted. In particular, subcompact car manufacturers were prohibited from
producing vehicles for any other market segment and vice versa. Also, the decree
established minimum local content requirements of 50 percent for passenger cars
and 65 percent for trucks, based on a material cost formula. The policy's goals,
which were made progressively more demanding, were increased local man-
ufacture and greater exports.
In 1977, the government announced a new decree to govern the automotive
industry. 101 Export requirements were given a new twist. Foreign exchange ex-
penditures (including local supplier imports, border dealer imports, interest pay-
ments, and royalties) were required to be offset 110 percent by export revenues if
the firm was operating at mandatory local content levels, or 100 percent if the firm
was operating at the higher recommended levels (beginning in June 1981). Also,
the production of more than one engine family was permitted only if the firm
exported at least 60 percent of the units of the additional family. 102 The new
decree further required that half of a vehicle manufacturer's import-compensating
exports be sourced from suppliers that had at least 60 percent local ownership.
Export revenue generated by border plant sales could account for no more than
20 percent of total foreign exchange requirements. In addition, majority local
ownership was required to manufacture or install diesel engines for trucks. 103
98. See id. at 54-55.
99. See C. Ford, supra note 95, at 20 (discussing the Mexican automotive policy statement of
1972).
100. This rebate was eliminated in 1977 because a large devaluation in the preceding year created
an undervalued peso. A similar measure was enacted in 1978 with rebates ranging from four percent
to 11 percent. See id. at 21.
101. Decree for the Development of the Motor Vehicle Industry, translated in MINISTRY OF
NATIONAL RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 2 MEXICO: NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT PLAN, 31-61 (1979).
102. Following the 1977 decree, all three major U.S. manufacturers announced the establishment
of major engine plants in Mexico with significant volumes targeted for exports.
103. For a more thorough discussion of the 1977 Automotive Decree, see C. Ford, supra note 95,
at 22-26.
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Hence, in addition to increased local manufacture and export promotion, govern-
ment authorities emphasized the goal of greater Mexican ownership in the
industry.
In the wake of Mexico's debt and payments crises of 1982-83, the government,
in an effort to rationalize the industry and reduce pressure on the balance of
payments, imposed the most stringent of all its automotive decrees. 04 The 1983
decree established new minimum levels of local content, which by 1987 will
reach 60 percent for passenger cars and 80 percent for trucks. 105 The decree also
requires that automobile manufacturers operate with a balanced foreign exchange
budget (which includes all payments abroad, including debt service, 106 and cov-
ers all supplier industries' foreign exchange requirements). The only exception is
for the import of capital goods connected with a project oriented toward export
production, and even then only under certain conditions. 107 The new decree
imposed tighter restrictions on the number of lines and models each company
could manufacture, but additional lines could be authorized if exports from the
new line generated sufficient foreign exchange to cover all external payments
associated with its production. 108 Furthermore, the decree requires that 25 per-
cent of production be economy class vehicles. 109
The decree limits imports of automatic transmissions to 20 percent of total
passenger car production for 1984 and these imports are expected to be phased
out entirely by 1988. Imports of specific luxury items (such as power windows
and power doorlocks) are prohibited by an earlier decree. Gasoline engines for
medium and heavy-duty trucks will be prohibited beginning in the 1986 model
year, which effectively excludes foreign firms from producing these trucks be-
cause previous decrees have prohibited foreign-owned firms from installing die-
sel engines in trucks." 0 Also, eight-cylinder engines were prohibited in
passenger cars in November 1984, and in light trucks starting in November
1985.111
Industrial policy in Mexico has imposed dramatic changes on the structure and
function of the automotive industry. Although the assembly industry had been
established in Mexico prior to the government's efforts to target the automotive
sector for development, its rapid growth, along with the development of the
vehicle manufacturing industry, came after performance requirements were in-
104. Decreto para la racionalizacion de la Industria Automotriz, Diario Oficial, 15 septiembre 1983
(Mex.) (Decree for the Rationalization of the Automotive Industry). For a delineation of the principal
measures of the 1983 decree, see N. Schuster, The Motor Vehicle Industry in Mexico 17 (Dec. 1983)
(paper by the Int'l Affairs Dep't, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n); Wharton Econometric Fore-
casting Assocs., DIEMEX-Wharton Mexican Letter I (Oct. 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mexican
Letter].
105. N. Schuster, supra note 104, at 17.
106. See Mexican Letter, supra note 104, at 1, 2.
107. Id. at 2. Imports of such items will not be counted as part of a firm's external payments as long
as the project for which they are used is completed by October 31, 1985, and the payments for the
items are financed over a ten-year period. Id.
108. Id. at 2, 4.
109. Id. at 4.
110. See C. Ford, supra note 95, at 25 (discussing the 1977 Automotive Decree).
111. Mexican Letter, supra note 104, at 4.
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stituted. However, it may have been the industry's growth potential that made it
possible to institute performance requirements rather than vice versa. The auto-
motive industry witnessed a consolidation following the introduction of perform-
ance requirements. The number of automotive firms operating in Mexico
declined from 16 in 1962 to 12 in 1967 and the number of car models assembled in
Mexico declined from 44 in 1962 to 22 in 1964. 112 But employment for the entire
sector increased fourfold and investment from 400 million pesos to three billion
pesos between 1962 and 1967. "1
The problems of overcapacity and high cost structure which result from the
imposition of trade barriers continue to be evident in the Mexican automotive
industry, however. These problems are the result of more vehicle lines and
models than are warranted by economy-of-scale efficiencies, as well as typically
higher-priced vehicles than comparable vehicles available in international mar-
kets." 4 In addition, efforts to restructure the industry have been imposed through
legal restrictions on the number of lines and models each firm can produce, rather
than through more flexible devices such as export subsidies, tax rebates, or other
measures that are less binding with respect to the functioning of market
mechanisms.
It is not clear whether the industrial policy measures aimed at developing the
automotive industry have eased or exacerbated problems related to the transfer of
labor from the agrarian to the industrial sectors in Mexico. It can be argued that
industrial policies contributed to the growth of employment in the automotive
industry, since jobs have been created. However, the net effect on employment
growth may well have been negative; indeed, such policies probably contributed
to the large mass of underemployed workers in Mexico. Efforts to develop the
automotive sector involved the reallocation of resources to an industry which
utilizes capital-intensive and skilled-labor-intensive production techniques. Con-
sequently, scarce resources were transferred from other sectors, including those
which use labor-intensive production techniques and in which a given amount of
investment would generate relatively more employment. Thus, a resource drain
on the agrarian sector, for example, may have intensified the adjustment costs
associated with the process of industrialization by further impoverishing rural-
agrarian areas and forcing mass migration to urban-industrial areas (or the United
States). This interpretation of the employment effects of Mexican industrial pol-
icy is consistent with the fact that the income elasticity of employment growth in
Mexico has been unusually low. "15
Moreover, it is probably true that import-substitution policies have moved
resources away from sectors in which Mexico has a comparative advantage to
those areas in which it does not; that is, away from the production of goods and
112, C. Ford, supra note 95, at 19.
113. Id. at 19-20.
114. See generally J. BEHRMAN, supra note 81, at 137 (discusses price controls and cost penalties
imposed on the Mexican auto industry).
115. Over the period from 1973 to 1983, the income elasticity of employment growth in Mexico
was 0.46. In the high period from 1973 to 1981, the income elasticity was even lower. For the data
used in making this calculation, see Wharton Econometric Forecasting Assocs., DIEMEX-Wharton:
Mexican Economic Outlook 205, 229 (Feb. 1985).
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services that use unskilled labor relatively intensively to those which require the
relatively intensive use of capital or skilled labor. And while it is likely that the
Mexican authorities' increasing orientation toward export promotion will improve
production in the automotive industry by increasing the possibility of realizing
economies of scale, there is no evidence that the government's efforts to allocate
resources toward the automotive industry, or toward the manufacturing sector in
general, have resulted in a change in the dynamic pattern of comparative advan-
tage. Nevertheless, costs of manufacture have always been reasonably attractive
in Mexico if sufficient volume could be achieved to reach world scale, as has
been the case with engine production. In this instance, Mexican industrial policy
has promoted the accumulation of human capital and technology.
Finally, the policies employed by the Mexican authorities have been more
distorting than alternative forms of industrial policy. In particular, Mexico has
typically adopted tariff, quota, and local content forms of protectionism rather
than production tax-cum-subsidy policies. The former are less efficient than the
latter for achieving such objectives as increasing production in a particular indus-
try because they include the negative demand side effects of inflated domestic
prices.
VI. AuSTRALIA
Over the past four decades the Australian Government, in varying degrees, has
sought to change the competitive conditions facing Australian industries. While
the objectives of these policies occasionally shifted with changes in the market
for Australian products at home and abroad, the instruments used to implement
the policies were largely limited to a mix of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on
imports.
Until 1960, the Australian Government followed a pattern very similar to that
of other resource-rich countries: it erected tariff barriers and quantitative re-
strictions to encourage the establishment of local production of many manufac-
tured goods. The primary goal motivating these import substitution policies was
to establish the local manufacture of many previously imported products. Policy
makers justified the shift from low-cost imports to high-cost domestic manufac-
ture on the ground that it would save scarce foreign exchange; reduce an exces-
sive sensitivity to the international trade cycle; and provide side benefits such as
human capital development and markets for supplier industries.
Moreover, during the fifties, prices for primary product exports-particularly
agricultural products-were declining relative to prices for manufactured im-
ports. "16 This phenomenon, referred to as the declining terms of trade between
primary product exports and manufactures, gave rise to the belief that Australian
living standards would decline relative to those in countries that were competitive
producers of manufactured goods. If Australian incomes were to keep pace,
Australia would have to become a competitive producer of manufactured prod-
ucts as well.
By 1960, however, Australian policy makers had begun to criticize the import
116. INT'L MONETARY FUND, 29 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 70-71 (1976).
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substitution policies. In many industries, tariff protection resulted in the pro-
liferation of high-cost domestic producers and failed to lead to cost efficiencies in
production. Public figures shifted their concern to the high cost that tariff protec-
tion appeared to be imposing on domestic consumers. An official inquiry board
reviewed the import substitution policies and recommended the elimination of all
quantitative restrictions on imports and further scrutiny of the high cost of tar-
iffs." 7 In 1960, Parliament eliminated all import quotas. 118
Economic events in and out of Australia also contributed to the shift in pri-
orities of government policies. Australian terms of trade improved as rapid
growth in the world's industrial economies increased demand for basic raw
materials and agricultural products. Moreover, the reduced level of import protec-
tion pushed some domestic manufacturers to seek out export markets in an effort
to achieve greater production efficiencies. Perhaps as important, the discovery
and development of major mineral deposits in Australia offered an attractive
alternative to investment in manufacturing in the late 1960s, and rapid growth of
the services sector created strong demand for office construction late in the
decade. 119
The oil shocks and subsequent recessions in Europe, Japan, and the United
States brought about a third generation of industrial policies in Australia. This
time Australian policy makers sought to develop a more comprehensive approach
to the development of specific industries in Australia. In 1973, an Act of Parlia-
ment 2° instructed the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) to fashion an
approach toward the development of industries which required "the Commission
to have regard to the desire of Australian Governments'. . . .to improve and
promote the well-being of the people of Australia, with full employment, sta-
bility in the general level of prices, viability in external economic relations,
conservation of the natural environment and rising and generally enjoyed stan-
dards of living." 2' In its report, the Commission recommended reduced levels of
tariff and quota protection to all industries. It argued that tariff reductions would
accomplish many of the goals set for industrial assistance strategy by allowing
market forces to allocate the nation's scarce resources. The Commission avoided
targeting specific industries for assistance and instead recommended across-the-
board reductions of tariffs by 25 percent.
Although the Commission's recommendation for tariff reductions was enacted,
the timing of the tariff cut could not have been worse from the point of view of
117. See FED. CHAMBER OF AUTOMOTIVE INDUS., I THE AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY]. The recommendations were
made by the Tariff Board which conducted its study between 1954 and 1957. See FED. CHAMBER OF
AUTOMOTIVE INDUS., AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE YEAR BOOK 1970, at 38 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1970 YEAR BOOK].
118. AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, supra note 117, at 35.
119. Bills, Love & Cocks, Financing Manufacturing: Past Trends and the Current Crisis, in
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 77 (Committee to Advise on Policies
for Manufacturing Industry ed. 1976).
120. Industries Assistance Commission Act 1973, AUSTL. ACTS P. no. 169 (1973).
121. Indus. Assistance Comm'n, The Industries Assistance Commission's Approach to the Devel-
opment of Industries-Implications and Procedures, in POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFAC-
TURING INDUSTRY 32 (Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry ed. 1976).
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public support. The Australian dollar appreciated 20 percent between 1972 and
1974 and the oil shock brought on a protracted worldwide recession. These two
factors added to the effect of the tariff reduction, reduced demand for domes-
tically manufactured products, and sharply increased unemployment in those
industries.
The policy reaction to these developments was to increase sharply assistance to
those industries hardest hit: textiles, clothing, footwear, and motor vehicles.
Moreover, the forms of protection assistance in the post-1973 round of measures
increased both the average rate of protection provided to these industries and the
dispersion of protection rates between different industries and among products
within the same industry. 122
Later studies by the Industries Assistance Commission of the effect of tariff
and quota protection on domestic industries show that those industries that en-
joyed the highest rate of protection generally had less growth in gross product
than less-protected industries and experienced sharper declines in employ-
ment. 23 Moreover, the IAC estimated the cost to consumers of quota entitlements
averaged $600 to $800 per household. 24
Notably, those Australian manufactured products which have been success-
fully exported in recent years have been those products least protected in the
domestic market. 25 These industries appear not to have been handicapped by the
small size of Australia's market in achieving production economies. Competition
from foreign products appears to have been a stimulus rather than a discourage-
ment to their development.
Automotive policy in Australia exhibits all the characteristics of the general
policy pattern. Government policies have promoted the development of an indig-
enous automotive industry from as early as 1917 when the Government first
encouraged local assembly by placing quantitative limits on the import of com-
pleted vehicles. 126 Between World Wars I and II, a market for some locally
manufactured components was created by prohibiting their import. 27 By 1940,
Australia was already contemplating the production of an all Australian-made
car. War shortages and demands further stimulated the development of supplier
and replacement parts industries. In 1945, the Minister for Post-War Reconstruc-
tion declared:
It is the policy of the Government to encourage the local manufacture of motor
vehicles. That policy is based on the overriding importance of motor transportation
to the future prosperity and development of Australia. The government looks to a
developing and expanding industry as the keystone that will consolidate the indus-
trial structure built up during the war. 121
122. See Krause, Australia's Comparative Advantage in International Trade, in THE AUSTRALIAN
ECONOMY: A VIEw FROM THE NORTH 290 table 7 (R. Caves & L. Krause ed. 1984).
123. See id. at 291 table 8.
124. See id. at 291.
125. For example, pumps and compressors; measuring, professional, and scientific equipment; and
cameras and optical goods.
126. See 1970 YEAR BOOK, supra note 117, at I.
127. See id.
128. R. DeRoeck, Political Economic and Automotive Development in Australia and New Zealand
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From the immediate postwar period until 1960, domestic automobile producers
were sheltered by import licensing which severely limited the quantity of com-
pleted vehicles that could be imported. The result was the proliferation of locally
assembled vehicles. Furthermore, because the licensing authorities made sure
that every existing firm obtained sufficient licenses to stay in business, the legis-
lation served to preserve an uneconomic, inefficient market structure. By 1969,
11 car companies producing or assembling 45 different car models were operating
in an Australian market in which new car sales did not exceed 350,000 units
annually. 129
In 1957, as a result of the Tariff Board's report, the Australian Government
expanded protection from assembly to component manufacture. 130 The law pro-
vided high tariff protection (42.5 percent) for any component manufactured in
Australia in sufficient quantities to supply the bulk of original equipment require-
ments. The law provided vehicle manufacturers with an incentive to make, or buy
locally, parts which they otherwise could have imported more cheaply. Cost
efficiency had only a small role in determining which components were pro-
duced. The result was expansion of component manufacture and increasingly
high-cost production.
The year 1960 marked the first shift toward a less protective automotive import
policy. In that year quantitative restrictions on the import of fully built-up cars
were abolished.' The next five years witnessed extremely rapid growth in
automobile sales and a reduction in the proportion of local content in production.
Vehicle registration nearly doubled between 1957 and 1964.132 Local content
dropped from 77 percent in 1958 to 67 percent in 1962-63. Imports of fully
assembled cars rose from just over three percent of new registrations in 1961 to
over 14 percent in 1965 despite high transport costs and 35 percent tariffs.' 33
The liberalization of automobile trade was short-lived, however. Australia's
reluctance to allow import competition to take a substantial market share from
any existing producers inspired new legislation. In 1965, the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturing Plan was enacted. 134 Under this plan, auto producers using a large
share of local content were granted duty concessions and low volume producers
unable to meet high local content standards were granted special protection.
Producers were allowed to choose between two basic plans. Plan "A" required
the company to achieve 95 percent local content within five years, but allowed
plan participants to import all their component requirements duty-free during the
buildup. Plan "B", designed for small volume producers, provided two options.
Either participants were committed to achieving 55 percent local content in two
41 (May 1977) (paper for General Motors Overseas Operations) (quoting Minister for Post-War
Reconstruction).
129. See 1970 YEAR BOOK, supra note 117, at 120.
130. See id. at 38.
131. AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, supra note 117, at 35.
132. See AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASS'N, WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1966, at 13
(1967).
133. See FED. CHAMBER OF AUTOMOTIVE INDUS., AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE YEAR BOOK 1968,
at 70, 117 (1968).
134. See INDUS. ASSISTANCE COMM'N, PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLES AND COMPONENTS-
POST-1984 ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS 254 (1981).
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years, and were granted duty concessions only on non-protected components, or
participants were required to assemble vehicles in Australia from completely-
knocked-down component kits (CKD packs) and were granted duty concessions
only on components which were sourced in Australia within 18 months. The
local content requirements raised the effective rate of protection on the domestic
portion of production by permitting some imported components to enter the
market at a lower rate than that which applied to finished products.
Even with this increased effective rate of protection, the local content require-
ments proved too stringent. Small volume producers who had entered the 95
percent plan found that their scale of operations did not justify the enormous
tooling expense necessary to increase the proportion of local components in
Australian cars. By 1968, a third alternative, which permitted only 85 percent
local content, was added to the plan. Successive modifications of the plan finally
converged into a single plan, effective from January 1, 1976, which required all
local producers to eventually use 85 percent local content in production. 135
Despite the frequent modifications in performance requirements to accommo-
date the problems of particular domestic producers, these years witnessed the exit
of two manufacturers, Volkswagen and British Leyland, from vehicle production
in Australia. Chrysler would sell its Australian production facilities to Mitsubishi
a few years later.
Any increased efficiencies that the exit of the German and British firms might
have afforded the remaining producers were almost immediately offset by an
official government decision to invite Nissan and Toyota to commence manufac-
ture in Australia. That decision reflected a cross-current of political and eco-
nomic forces. By 1975, imports of completed cars from Japan exceeded 23
percent of the Australian car market 3 6 despite a 35 percent tariff. The increase in
imports of completed cars threatened to continue taking market share from do-
mestic producers, who had invested heavily in production facilities in Australia
in order to meet local content requirements. To support those firms that had
conformed to the local content plans, the Australian Government reimposed
quotas on imports of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. 1
37
In this same period, however, Australia was enjoying a large surplus in its trade
with Japan and the Japanese objected strenuously to restrictions impeding their
access to the Australian market. Moreover, the Australian consumer wanted to be
able to buy small, fuel-efficient vehicles produced by Japanese firms. Therefore,
the Australian Government offered the Japanese the opportunity to establish local
production facilities to service the Australian market. The entry of additional
low-volume producers, operating at high local content levels, tended to exacer-
bate the already fragmented character of component manufacture and militated
against the achievement of economically efficient production volumes.
These policies did increase the proportion of automotive components produced
in Australia, but they did so at considerable cost to production efficiency. That
135. See INDUS. ASSISTANCE COMM'N, MOTOR VEHICLES-IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 10-11 (1975).
136. See MOTOR VEHICLES MANUFACTURERS ASS'N OF THE U.S., WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE
DATA 1976, at 134-35 (1977).
137. See INDUS. ASSISTANCE COMM'N, supra note 134, at 256.
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cost was reflected in the escalation of tariff rates on both components and CKD
kits from 1975 to the present. In 1975, the basic tariff rate on CKD kits was 25
percent. In that same year, a trigger tariff was introduced which established a
higher tariff (27.5 percent) when imports exceeded 20 percent of the market. 38
In 1976, the basic CKD pack rate was increased to 35 percent. 139 From 1975 to
1980, the tariff rate on completed car imports increased from 35 percent to 57.5
percent and import quotas were enacted. 140
The Industries Assistance Commission estimated that the cost of assistance
was even higher. In its calculation, which includes the cost of tariffs, quantitative
restrictions on imports, and production and export subsidies, it found that the
average effective rate of assistance to the motor vehicle industry rose from 52
percent in 1968-69 to 158 percent in 1981-82. 14'
Alarmed by the high cost of protecting the automotive industry, the Commis-
sion recommended returning to duty-only protection. It argued that cost efficien-
cies could only be achieved through elimination of the local content plan and
reductions in tariff protection which would put pressure on local producers to
seek scale economies in production through exports and larger shares of the local
market. The Commission's recommendations were not enacted.
In December 1981, the Australian Government released the Post-1984 Pas-
senger Car Plan. 142 This plan maintains the two-tier tariff structure in effect since
1975, with higher tariff rates applying to imports above certain import quota
limits. The tariff on imports above the quota limit is 150 percent in 1985 and is
considered prohibitive. Cars imported under the quota are subject to a 57.5
percent tariff which provides an effective rate of protection of 67.6 percent to
domestic value added. All firms producing for the local market are subject to 85
percent local content requirements.
The "export-facilitation credit" is the only notable shift in the protectionist
policies in the post-1984 Passenger Car Plan. This clause permits exporting firms
to reduce the proportion of local content in production and increase the propor-
tion of duty-free components for which they are eligible, provided they achieve
an equal dollar value of incremental exports of automotive goods. In other words,
the sum of the value of the new export activity and the remaining manufacture for
domestic consumption totals the original value of domestic manufacture. The
new activity is likely to be at world scale volumes, however, and the activities
displaced should be the least efficient ones. At the same time the total value
added in the industry (domestic and export) is unchanged. While the export
requirement forces firms to produce some components competitively in order to
sell them internationally, it also increases the effective rate of protection on the
domestic value added in the car that is sold in the Australian market. A firm that
exports the full 15 percent allowed under the scheme can import duty-free up to
138. See id.
139. Id. at 78.
140. See id. at 256, 259.
141. See Krause, supra note 122, at 288.
142. For a summary of the major components of the plan, see Bowden, New car policy hits at
Ford, Mitsubishi, The Australian, Dec. 22, 1981, at 1.
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30 percent of the components used in producing the vehicle sold in Australia.
The duty rate which applies to the entire value of completed car imports and
CKD imports protects the 70 percent domestic value added in the car produced
under the local content plan.
The export-facilitation credit may promote efficiency in production, since it
permits automakers to eliminate the least efficient element in their operations and
probably increases the scale of operation in the manufacture of the components
that are exported. There is a risk, however, that instead of displacing high-cost
manufacturing, the export scheme will be used as a means of avoiding new
capital investment. If so, inefficient manufacture of components could continue
indefinitely.
Australian industrial policy has been limited almost exclusively to tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on imports. A key motivation for the policy has been the
belief that the small size of Australian markets precluded achieving economies of
scale in production and that if Australia is to develop its manufacturing base, it
must protect local producers from foreign competition.
The long-term results of these policies have brought their usefulness into
question, however. Production in the most protected industries has been frag-
mented and inefficient, with many producers servicing the small national mar-
ket. 143 Moreover, the cost of protection has risen sharply as Australian producers
have become less efficient relative to their foreign competition. In the automotive
industry, tariffs and quotas have screened local producers from the competition of
world-scale producers and have allowed the development of local automotive
production which probably would not have otherwise occurred.
These same policies have thus far failed to promote an efficient scale of
production in the automotive sector. Currently, no manufacturer dominates Aus-
tralia's relatively small automotive market, and no car model is manufactured in a
volume greater than 60,000 units a year. Indeed, the situation has apparently
deteriorated since 1964 when no import quotas existed, and tariff rates were
generally lower. Then, the dominant manufacturer produced 130,000 units per
year of its most popular model.
As in all of the cases studied here, however, the viability and profitability of
the Australian automotive industry have been affected by more than industry-
specific governmental policies. The Australian economy and with it the auto-
motive sector was buffeted by oil shocks and two worldwide recessions in the
1970s. While the industry clearly has lost ground in the past two decades, at least
part of the blame lies with the same market forces that reduced the profitability of
less-protected producers in the United States: namely, high fuel prices and com-
petition from small, fuel-efficient Japanese cars. On balance, however, it is
difficult to argue that tariff and trade policies directed toward Australian auto-
mobile producers have enhanced either the viability or profitability of the
industry.
143. See generally Caves, Scale, Openness, and Productivity in Manufacturing Industries, in THE
AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY: A VIEW FROM THE NORTH, supra note 122, at 313-47 (R. Caves & L.
Krause eds. 1984) (contains a study of the effects of these policies).
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V11. CONCLUSION
In the preceding descriptions of various industrial policies there are several
recurrent motives for measures applied to the automotive industry. They include:
(1) development of an automotive industry either locally owned or independent of
reliance on foreign support;
(2) achievement of optimum economies of scale and financial strength in the
finished vehicle industry or its supplier industries;
(3) achievement of international competitiveness;
(4) achievement of exports;
(5) saving of foreign exchange;
(6) promotion of technological diffusion; and
(7) accumulation of human capital in the form of skilled workers.
Lack of quantification and an inability to isolate the effects of the industry-
specific measures from those that may have come from outside forces necessi-
tates cautiously phrased conclusions. In some cases, the effectiveness of an
automotive industrial policy has been considered in light of how well it contrib-
uted to the goals of a general industrial policy, such as economic growth and job
creation. In other cases, the effect of the policy has been assessed in terms of the
strength of the industry itself as measured by profits, prices, or size.
The strongest conclusion that emerges from the six studies in this review is that
the general direction and strength of the economy remains the dominant influence
on the automotive industry, even in the face of strong government-sponsored
industrial policy programs. While the automotive industry may contribute to the
economy's growth rate and direction, it is a relatively small part of any country's
industrial structure, thus such industry-specific intervention usually will have
little effect on the economy as a whole. Furthermore, the costs of misdirecting
resources to a chosen sector are born by other sectors. The net outcome of
measures aimed at stimulating a specific industry may not be a net gain for all.
The study also demonstrates that the clearest success of industrial policy in
shaping the automotive industry has been in the area of ownership and control.
Japan ensured that its locally owned companies prevailed over foreign-owned
companies in the domestic market. France seems to have maintained a minimal
role for foreign companies by merging weaker domestic units into national
groups, although minority foreign participation has been useful in the interna-
tionalization of the industry. Australia, when confronted with the choice of
importing Japanese vehicles or establishing within Australia Japanese-owned
motor vehicle manufacturers, chose the latter as a clear decision of industrial
policy.
Insuring local ownership may be merely a matter of national preference for
local institutions or it may be a strategy calculated to allow for maximum govern-
ment control. In any event, it is not clear that national economic advantages flow
from the nationality of ownership although many governments act as if they do.
Our judgments on industrial policy have been confined to what the policies
succeed in doing to the economies of the industry or nation, rather than their
influence on the legal control of production.
Countries have been able to encourage investment and generate greater cash
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for capital expenditures through industrial policy measures such as tax incentives
for chosen industries. This seems to have occurred in Japan, both for the auto
industry itself and its supplier chain. Brazil also has followed clear measures of
tax encouragement fairly specific to motor vehicles. While such measures may
have helped to create world-scale economic units, it is likely that other forces
were also at work. Growth in the domestic market and the launch of a govern-
ment program encouraging exports provided the demand to achieve a higher scale
of production.
Other goals of industrial policy directed at the automotive industry include the
upgrading of labor skills and the promotion of technological knowledge. It may
be argued that the net gains from human capital formation in a protected industry
may be outweighed by the costs of protection. Also, foreign direct investment in
the automotive industry has brought some modem production technologies to
countries such as Brazil and Mexico. It is not always clear, however, that the
unsubsidized local product is always fully competitive as an import with vehicles
produced in markets where the technological competition may be even more
severe.
Apart from the effect of market expansion on the volume of sales and therefore
on the scale of production, it is not clear that industrial policies have themselves
succeeded in putting together efficient business units. For example, industrial
policies based on import substitution typically generated inefficiencies due to the
high cost structure of the protected automotive industry and its inability to
achieve an economic production volume as a result of poor competitiveness in
world markets. Governments have typically responded to these problems by
providing export incentives, which in many cases have been crucial for achieving
international competitiveness, and by undertaking rationalization efforts, which
have had ambiguous results. The Japanese automotive industry was the object of
restructuring attempts by MITI which bore little fruit and, in fact, would have
disadvantaged the industry later if they had succeeded. This contrasts with other
Japanese interventionist policies that were highly successful.
The most common industrial policy technique for the automotive industry in
the countries reviewed has been measures affecting trade: import restraint or
export promotion. Though this shared thread seems to be the distinguishing
characteristic of industrial policy, it does not necessarily achieve common results.
A number of forms of trade measures may be involved in industrial policy, from
fairly benign and unsubsidized export requirements, to actual or hidden subsidies
which may well have a predatory influence on other countries. There may also be
strict import controls. Such trade measures can be used secondarily to affect
volume and scale of production; moreover, the threat of withdrawal of protection
can be used to persuade domestic companies to take other measures such as new
investment. Trade measures can be used to encourage foreign investment to get
behind trade walls. Or trade measures may be employed to force global ra-
tionalization of the industry in small markets. '44 Japan is the best example of a
144. Global rationalization attempts to achieve economies of scale by mandating reduction of
makes and models while encouraging commonality of engineering design. This concept is incorpo-
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case in which trade measures were used to build international competitiveness
where it did not exist before. In other cases trade measures have not succeeded in
producing an internationally competitive automotive industry. The role of gov-
ernment policy in facilitating comparative advantage is, therefore, currently
controversial. 145
rated into the "world car" whose efficient manufacture can be divided among several countries where
it would not be efficient to do it in any single country because of the small size of its domestic market.
145. Charles Schultze points out the lack of clear economic criteria for nations to attain industrial
preeminence in specific industries and cites Assar Lindbeck's argument that the origins of industrial
specialization are largely historical coincidence and momentum. See Schultze, Industrial Policy: A
Dissent, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1983, at 3, 8-10; Lindbeck, Industrial Policy as an Issue in the
Economic Environment, 4 WORLD ECON. 391, 394 (1981). Zysman and Tyson, on the other hand,
point out that comparative advantage is a dynamic process in which government policy can play a role
in altering the situation of particular industries. See Zysman and T'son, American Industry in
International Competition, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 20-48 (J.
Zysman & L. Tyson eds. 1983).
